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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
Deliverable D6.3 “Reliability, Availability, Maintainability and Survivability – alpha version” of the 
DTOceanPlus project include the details of the Assessment Design Tools module: “Reliability, 
Availability, Maintainability and Survivability” (RAMS), and it presents the result of the work 
developed during the tasks T6.2 and T6.4 of the project. This document serves as the technical 
manual of the alpha version of the RAMS module, including all the data requirements, main functions, 
interfaces and all the pertinent technical details. 
This document summarises both the functionalities as well as the more technical aspects of the code 
implemented for the alpha version of this module. The RAMS module will provide the user with the 
assessments pertinent to the component-level and system-level reliability, the time-based 
availability, the maintainability and the survivability (for the perspectives of both ultimate and fatigue 
limit states). The Business Logic of the code, i.e. the actual functions of the RAMS module, has been 
implemented in Python 3. Moreover, the code is provided with an Application Programming Interface 
(API), developed in OpenAPI, in order to interact and communicate with the other modules of the 
DTOceanPlus platform: A Graphical User Interface (GUI) is being developed, consistently with the 
other modules, in Vue.js, allowing the user to interact easily with the RAMS module, inputting data 
and visualising results. 
The Business Logic of the code has been partly verified (more than 91%) through the implementation 
of unit tests, guaranteeing easy maintainability for future developments of the tool. A section of 
examples completes the present document, showing the capabilities of the tool. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
1.1 SCOPE AND OUTLINE OF THE REPORT 
Deliverable D6.3 “Reliability, Availability, Maintainability and Survivability Tool – alpha version” of the 
DTOceanPlus project includes the details of the Assessment Design Tool module: “Reliability, 
Availability, Maintainability and Survivability” (RAMS), and it presents the results of the work 
developed during the tasks T6.2 and T6.4 in the project. This document serves as the technical manual 
of the alpha version of the RAMS module, including all the data requirements, main functions, 
interfaces and all the pertinent technical details. The alpha version of this tool is a fully functional 
version of the tool in terms of implementation of the calculations covered by the RAMS module 
(Business Logic).  
This document summarises: 
1) The RAMS framework and assumptions (Section 2),  
2) Use cases and the functionalities (Section 3) of the RAMS tool, namely providing the user 
with a set of relevant metrics and assessments on Reliability, Availability, Maintainability and 
Survivability.  
3) The actual implementation of the tool, describing the architecture of the tool, the 
technologies adopted for the implementation and the results of the testing (Section 4).  
4) The testing of the code: the Business Logic of the code has been tested through the 
implementation of unit tests, guaranteeing easy maintainability for future developments of 
the tool (Section 4.2). 
5) A set of extensive examples, to provide the reader with an overall view of the capabilities of 
the tools (Section 5). 
1.2 SUMMARY OF THE DTOCEANPLUS PROJECT 
The RAMS module belongs to the suite of tools “DTOceanPlus” developed within the EU-funded 
project DTOceanPlus [1]. DTOceanPlus aims to accelerate the commercialisation of the Ocean 
Energy sector by developing and demonstrating an open source suite of design tools for the selection, 
development, deployment and assessment of ocean energy systems (including sub-systems, energy 
capture devices and arrays) and at various levels of complexity.  
At a high level, the suite of tools developed in DTOceanPlus will include: 
 Structured Innovation tool (SI), for concept creation, selection, and design.  
 Stage Gate tool (SG), using metrics to measure, assess and guide technology development. 
 Deployment tools, supporting optimal device and array deployment: 
▪ Site Characterisation (SC): to characterise the site, including metocean, geotechnical, and 
environmental conditions. 
▪ Machine Characterisation (MC): to characterise the prime mover. 
▪ Energy Capture (EC): to characterise the device at an array level. 
▪ Energy Transformation (ET): to design PTO and control solutions. 
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▪ Energy Delivery (ED): to design electrical and grid connection solutions. 
▪ Station Keeping (SK): to design moorings and foundations solutions. 
▪ Logistics and Marine Operations (LMO): to design logistical solutions and operation plans related 
to the installation, operation, maintenance, and decommissioning operations. 
 Assessment Tools, to evaluate projects in terms of key parameters: 
▪ System Performance and Energy Yield (SPEY): to evaluate projects in terms of energy 
performance. 
▪ System Lifetime Costs (SLC): to evaluate projects from the economic perspective. 
▪ System Reliability, Availability, Maintainability, Survivability (RAMS): to evaluate the 
reliability aspects of a marine renewable energy project. 
▪ Environmental and Social Acceptance (ESA): to evaluate the environmental and social impacts 
of a given wave and tidal energy projects. 
 
These will be supported by underlying common digital models and a global database, as shown 
graphically in Figure 1.1. 
The RAMS module is one of Assessment Tools, and will assess such metrics as reliability, availability, 
maintainability, and survivability of marine energy conversion systems. The objective of this manual 
is to document the implementation of theoretical methods assessing these metrics in the RAMS 
module, and to help the end users understand the technical details of the RAMS module. 
 
FIGURE 1.1. REPRESENTATION OF DTOCEANPLUS TOOLS 
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2. RAMS FRAMEWORK AND ASSUMPTIONS 
2.1 RAMS FRAMEWORK 
2.1.1 OVERVIEW 
The definitions of such terminologies as reliability, availability, maintainability, and survivability, are 
given below.  
 Reliability – the ability of a structure or structural member to fulfil the specified requirements, 
during the working life, for which it has been designed [2]. 
 Availability – theoretically refers to the probability that a system or component is performing its 
required function at a given point in time or over a stated period of time when operated and 
maintained in a prescribed manner [3]. However, in most of the engineering applications, it is 
defined as the ratio of the uptime to the design lifetime [4]. 
 Maintainability – the ability of a system to be repaired and restored to service when maintenance 
is conducted by personnel using specified skill levels and prescribed procedures and resources [5]. 
 Survivability – the probability that the converter will stay on station over the stated operational 
life [6]. 
2.1.2 DATA STRUCTURE OF INPUT DATA 
2.1.2.1 Hierarchy 
A hierarchy of a system/ subsystem is a digital representation illustrating the working philosophy and 
the interrelationship between the units at different levels in this system/ sub-system. A tree-like data 
structure, where each unit is denoted as a node, is used to represent such a hierarchy, which can be 
stored in some typical data formats, e.g. pandas table and dictionary.  
A hierarchy is constructed by means of the bottom-up technique, and the steps for defining such a 
hierarchy are briefly summarized as follows: 
 Identification of nodes representing the basic components. 
 Categorization of the basic components into groups; each group is a sub-assembly and stands for 
an intermediate-level node; according to the rules in the tree-like data structure, the basic 
components are considered as children of this intermediate-level node; a logic gate is inserted 
between the basic nodes (representing the basic components) and the intermediate-level node to 
reflect the logic dependencies between these nodes. 
 These identified first-level subassemblies can be considered ‘basic’ components in order to identify 
the second-level subassemblies (a higher level) based upon the same method mentioned in the 
second bullet point; and this procedure can be repeated until the system to be analysed is reached. 
The concept of logic gates is borrowed from the classic fault tree analysis [7]. However, the meanings 
of the logic gates defined in the hierarchy are different from their counterparts in the classic fault tree 
analysis, because the logic dependencies are defined from the perspective of energy transfer, instead 
of failures of units. A comparison of logic gates has been made, as given in Table 2.1. 
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It should be born in mind that the logic gates in a hierarchy will be automatically converted to the 
correct logic gates in the code in business logic.  
TABLE 2.1 COMPARISON OF LOGIC GATES IN HIERARCHICAL STRUCTURES AND FAULT TREES 
Logic Gate 
Fundamental 
Definition 
Interpretation in  
Fault Tree 
Interpretation in  
Hierarchy 
‘AND’ 
 
 
The ‘AND’ gate indicates 
that the output event ‘A’ 
occurs only when all the 
input events (Ei, i=1,2,3) 
occur at the same time. 
If each Ei represents a 
component and A represents 
a subsystem, the ‘AND’ gate 
can be understood in such a 
way:  
If all Eis fail, A fails. 
If each Ei represents a 
component and A 
represents a subsystem, 
the ‘AND’ gate can be 
understood in such a way:  
If either of Eis fails, A fails. 
‘OR’ 
 
The ‘OR’ gate indicates that 
the output event ‘A’ occurs if 
any of the input events (Ei, 
i=1,2,3) occur. 
If each Ei represents a 
component and A represents 
a subsystem, the ‘OR’ gate 
can be understood in such a 
way:  
If either of Eis fails, A fails. 
If each Ei represents a 
component and A 
represents a subsystem, 
the ‘OR’ gate can be 
understood in such a way:  
If all Eis fail, A fails. 
 
Besides the logic dependencies, the failure modes and the associated failure rates should also be 
defined in the hierarchy. A failure mode is defined as the manner in which a unit could potentially fail 
to meet or deliver the intended function(s). The identification of system-level failure modes at the 
operational stage is out of work scope of the RAMS module. Unless otherwise specified, RAMS only 
cases about the failure modes of the basic components, including two major types:  
 Failure mode 1 – failures which can be restored through repair 
 Failure mode 2 – the cases in which the severely failed components can only be replaced 
A template of hierarchy is given in Table 2.2. The first column gives the subsystem or system to be 
analysed. All failure events are considered nodes in the hierarchy. The second column, ‘Name of 
Node’, gives the names of these failure events. The third column, ‘Design Id’, gives the identification 
labels of the basic components and other units. Design Ids are named according to the rules/ 
conventions of the Energy Delivery (ED) module. The column, ‘Node Type’, defines the levels of a 
hierarchy. The column, ‘Node SubType’, defines the additional information the design modules use 
to identify the corresponding node. The column, ‘Category’, defines which levels the nodes in the 
‘Name of Node’ column belong to in the fault tree. The columns ‘Parent’ and ‘Child’ define the 
dependencies of units at various levels. Each entry in ‘Parent’ defines the label of the higher-level unit 
which the current unit in the column ‘Name of Node’ belongs to. Each entry in ‘Child’ defines the labels 
of lower-level units which belong to the current unit. Based upon the aforementioned descriptions, 
the units in the column ‘Child’ are connected through a specific logic gate to the higher-level unit. The 
logic gates are given in the column ‘Gate Type’. The logic gate in each entry of this column is used to 
connect the unit in the column ‘Name of Node’ and the units in the column ‘Child’. The last two 
columns give the failure rates of basic components for both Type 1 & Type 2 failure modes.  
A few examples demonstrating how a hierarchy is defined and used in the system-level reliability 
assessment will be given in Section 5.  
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TABLE 2.2 TEMPLATE OF HIERARCHY 
System 
Name 
of 
Node 
Design 
Id 
Node 
Type 
Node 
Subtype 
Category Parent Child 
Gate 
Type 
Failure 
Rate 
Repair 
[1/hour] 
Failure 
Rate 
Replacement 
[1/hour] 
           
 
2.1.2.2 Stresses/ Loads 
The survivability will be assessed from the perspectives of both the ultimate and fatigue limit states, 
based upon the structural reliability method [8] [9] [10]. The ultimate stresses/ loads are used to assess 
the survival probability from the perspective of the ultimate limit state. The fatigue stress/ load ranges 
are used to assess the survival probability from the perspective of the fatigue limit state. RAMS 
requires these inputs from the Energy Transformation (ET) and Station Keeping (SK) modules. A 
simplified limit state function will be used for the survivability assessment from the perspective of the 
ultimate limit state. The S-N curve-based approach will be used to define the fatigue limit state [11]. 
See Section 2.2 for more details regarding the assumptions of the survivability assessment. 
2.1.2.3 Downtime 
Downtime is a measure of a time duration of a facility which does not work normally (no generation 
of power). Generally, availability is assessed according to downtime. The downtime provided by the 
Logistics and Marine Operations (LMO) module is a three-dimensional array. The three dimensions 
respectively represent the devices, the calendar years, and the hours during the downtime. A 
schematic illustration of the data structure storing downtime is shown in Figure 2.1. 
 
FIGURE 2.1 A SKETCH ILLUSTRATING THE DATA STRUCTURE FOR DOWNTIME 
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2.1.2.4 Maintenance Plan 
A maintenance plan developed by LMO defines the data related to maintenance activities. RAMS only 
requires the ids of the components (device ids as well) to be repaired and the mean time to repair 
(MTTR). A few commonly used terminologies regarding maintenance time are shown in Figure 2.2. 
Time to repair (TTR) includes the waiting time, the repair time and the time for testing and restoring 
to the normal condition. MTTR can be typically defined as the ratio of the summation of TTRs to the 
time of repairs. 
In nature, TTR is a stochastic variable, which follows a probabilistic distribution. RAMS predefines 
some default probabilistic distributions for the user to choose from. The MTTR provided by LMO is 
considered the mean of the probabilistic distribution. Besides MTTR, the user should also input the 
standard deviation or the coefficient of variance of the TTR.  
For the time being, the default probabilistic distributions include Gaussian, LogNormal and 
Exponential. 
 
FIGURE 2.2 A SKETCH ILLUSTRATING TIME TO REPAIR (TTR) 
2.2 ASSUMPTIONS 
It should be noted that the RAMS assessment results make sense, if and only if the assumptions made 
in the RAMS code hold. These assumptions include the fundamental ones which are embedded in the 
theoretical basis, and some specific assumptions tailor-made for the DTOceanPlus project. 
The fundamental assumptions are:  
 Reliability assessment 
▪ The failures of different basic components are statistically independent. 
▪ The time-to-failure (TTF) of the same component is statistically independent; so, the 
exponential probabilistic distribution is used to simulate the TTF for each basic component. 
▪ The fault tree (FT) approach is used to analyse the failures of units. A unit can be a system, a 
subsystem or a subassembly.  
 Availability assessment 
▪ The availability of the marine energy farm/ array is the ratio of the total uptime to the sum of 
the uptime and the downtime, regardless of the causes(s) of the downtime.  
 Maintainability assessment 
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▪ Due to the lack of historical repair-time data, the parametric method cannot be used to fit the 
probabilistic distribution of the repair-time; so, three default types of probabilistic distributions, 
namely, Gaussian, LogNormal, or Exponential, will be the options for the user to choose from. 
 Survivability assessment 
▪ Focus is only put on the probabilities of critical structural/ mechanical components surviving the 
stresses/ loads during the lifetime. 
The specific assumptions for the DTOceanPlus project are: 
 Reliability assessment 
▪ The logic dependencies between units at different levels are defined in a hierarchy from the 
perspective of energy transfer. 
▪ No inspection is conducted and the annual of probabilities of failure (PoFs) will not be provided. 
 Maintainability assessment 
▪ According the rule set up by LMO, MTTR is only estimated for the components which need to 
be repaired. 
▪ The minimum of the probabilities that the damaged components can be successfully repaired 
within a stated time interval will be the output.  
 Survivability assessment 
▪ The sea states chosen in the Deployment Design tools and analysed in ET are enough to 
approximately estimate the ultimate stress/ load probabilistic distribution. 
▪ The sea states from ET are enough to estimate the probabilistic distribution of the long-term 
stress ranges. 
▪ The modelling procedure set by the SK module is refined enough to capture the most critical 
load cases. 
▪ The stress range corresponding to the 10000 cycles of the chosen S-N curve is a rough 
estimation of the yielding strength of the material of the primary structural/ mechanical 
component. 
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3. USE CASES AND FUNCTIONALITIES 
3.1 OVERVIEW 
The Reliability, Availability, Maintainability and Survivability (RAMS) module will:  
 Perform the component-level and system-level reliability assessment on the units at different 
levels in a marine energy system (array); the component-level reliability assessment provides the 
outputs of the mean time to failure (MTTF) of basic components and the simulated time-to-failure 
(TTF) of these basic components; the system-level reliability assessment obtains the information 
on the logic dependencies and the interrelationship between units at different levels in the marine 
energy system (array) defined in the hierarchies, and provides the outputs of the annual 
probabilities of failure (PoFs) as a function of time for the units at higher levels in the hierarchies.  
 Calculate the availability for each device.  
 Estimate the probabilities that the damaged components can be successfully repaired within a 
stated time interval given procedures and resources. 
 Estimate the probability of critical structural/ mechanical components surviving the stresses/ loads 
during the design lifetime. 
With the aim to assess the reliability, availability, maintainability, and survivability of units at various 
levels in an array, the RAMS module requires the inputs from the design tools and exports the outputs 
to the Stage Gate tool, the Structure Innovation tool and the LMO module, as illustrated in Figure 3.1. 
Brief descriptions regarding the inputs and outputs are marked above the arrows representing the 
data flow. 
When an analysis is run completely, the output (reliability, availability, maintainability, and 
survivability) from the RAMS module will be fed to the Stage Gate (SG) and Structured Innovation (SI) 
tools. The Logistics and Marine Operations (LMO) and RAMS modules will work closely on defining 
maintenance strategies and develop some shared public functions to provide the optimal 
maintenance plan.  
 
(a) 
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(b) 
 
(c) 
 
(d) 
 
(e) 
FIGURE 3.1 INTERFACE BETWEEN RAMS AND OTHER MODULES/TOOLS       
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3.2 THE USE CASES 
The Generic User Case can be generally summarised as shown in Figure 3.2. 
 
FIGURE 3.2 GENERIC USE CASE FOR USING THE RAMS TOOL  
The User can: 
1) Run RAMS within the framework of the Stage Gate (SG) or Structured Innovation (SI) tools 
2) Run RAMS after running the set of Deployment Design tools of DTOceanPlus 
3) Use in standalone mode. 
By considering the three Use cases above mentioned, Table 3.1 summarises the dependencies of 
RAMS from/to other modules in DTOceanPlus. 
 
TABLE 3.1 DEPENDENCIES OF RAMS FROM/TO OTHER MODULES IN DTOCEANPLUS 
Modules that provide services that 
RAMS consumes 
Modules that are consuming 
services from RAMS 
Energy Delivery (ED), 
Energy Transformation (ET), 
Station Keeping (SK), 
Logistics & Marine Operations (LMO) 
Structured Innovation (SI), 
Stage Gate (SG) 
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3.2.1 USE CASE WITHIN THE FRAMEWORK OF SG/SI DESIGN TOOLS 
In this case, the RAMS tool will be run within the framework of the Stage Gate or Structured 
Innovation tools, as shown in Figure 3.3. The following steps are identified for this use case: 
1) The user runs the framework of the SI/SG Tools 
2) The SI/SG will require eventually some assessment results from the RAMS module 
3) The RAMS Module will check if the needed information is available and in case it is not, it will 
request the user to input the information from the relevant Deployment Design Tools 
4) The User will complement the information and run the Deployment Design Tools 
5) RAMS will be run and perform the assessments 
6) RAMS will provide the assessments to SI/SG Tools to complete their framework  
The outcome will be shown to the user. 
 
FIGURE 3.3 USE CASE FOR USING THE RAMS TOOL WITHIN THE FRAMEWORK OF SG/SI TOOLS 
 
3.2.2 USE CASE AFTER DEPLOYMENT DESIGN TOOLS 
In this case, the User will run one or more Deployment Design Tools and then they will run the RAMS 
module to carry out the assessments, as shown in Figure 3.4. The numerical results as well as the 
graphs/diagrams will be exposed to the user. 
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FIGURE 3.4 USE CASE FOR USING THE RAMS TOOL AFTER RUNNING THE DEPLOYMENT DESIGN 
TOOLS 
 
3.2.3 STANDALONE MODE 
In this case, all the input data should be available in advance of running the RAMS tool as highlighted 
in Figure 3.5. 
 
  FIGURE 3.5 USE CASE FOR USING THE RAMS TOOL STANDALONE 
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3.3 THE FUNCTIONALITIES 
The RAMS module mainly assesses reliability, availability, maintainability, and survivability, at three 
complexity levels (CL).   
Reliability: it includes two-level assessment, namely 
Component-level: gives the time series of failure events of basic components and the mean time 
to failure (MTTF)  
System-level: gives the probabilities of failure (PoFs) of units at various levels based upon the 
hierarchical structure of this subsystem.  
Availability: it is a time-based metric and calculated for every device, based upon the downtime 
provided by LMO.  
Maintainability: it gives the mean time to repair (MTTR) and indicates the probabilities that the 
damaged components can be successfully repaired within a stated time interval given procedures and 
resources.  
Survivability: it indicates the probability of structural/ mechanical components surviving the lifetime 
loads/ stresses. 
The differences of the functionalities between three CLs are summarised in Table 3.2. It should be 
noted that: RAMS, as an assessment module, highly depends upon the accuracy of the inputs; most 
of the functions/ methods between three complexity levels are the same. For example, the hierarchies 
at complexity level 3 should be more complicated than those at complexity level 1 (probably, more 
intermediate levels and more basic components). The same code is used; however, the results should 
be significantly different.  
TABLE 3.2 COMPARISON OF THE FUNCTIONALITIES BETWEEN THREE COMPLEXITY LEVELS 
Assessment Complexity Level 1 Complexity Level 2 Complexity Level 3 
Reliability 
The same functions/methods are used at all levels for both  
the component-level and system-level reliability assessment 
Availability The same functions/methods are used at all levels 
Maintainability The same functions/methods are used at all levels 
Survivability 
For ULS, Monte Carlo 
Simulation is the only 
available approach; 
For FLS, Monte Carlo 
Simulation is the only 
available approach. 
For ULS, both FORM and 
Monte Carlo Simulation 
are available; 
For FLS, Monte Carlo 
Simulation is the only 
available approach. 
For ULS, both FORM and 
Monte Carlo Simulation 
are available; 
For FLS, Monte Carlo 
Simulation is the only 
available approach. 
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3.3.1 RELIABILITY 
3.3.1.1 Objectives 
The component-level and system-level reliability assessments are performed for the marine energy 
conversion farm/array and the ED, ET, and SK subsystems. The component-level assessment aims to 
simulate the TTF and calculate the MTTFs for the basic components. The system-level assessment 
aims to estimate the PoFs as a function of time for the units at higher levels in the hierarchy. 
3.3.1.2 Inputs, Models and Outputs 
Inputs 
The input data for assessing reliability are listed in Table 3.3. See the description of the data structure 
of the hierarchy in Table 2.2 in Section 2.1.2.1. 
TABLE 3.3 INPUTS FOR ASSESSING RELIABILITY 
ID Brief  Description of Input Quantity Origin of the Data 
Data Model in 
RAMS 
Unit 
hierarchy_ed 
The hierarchical structure of the ED 
subsystem 
The ED tool Dictionary - 
hierarchy_et 
The hierarchical structure of the ET 
subsystem 
The ET tool Dictionary - 
hierarchy_sk 
The hierarchical structure of the SK 
subsystem 
The SK tool Dictionary - 
 
Theoretical basis 
See ANNEX 1 for more details of the theoretical basis.  
Outputs 
The outputs comprise the following items:  
 Simulated TTFs of basic components included in the hierarchies 
 MTTFs of basic components included in the hierarchies 
 The PoFs of units at higher levels in the hierarchies 
3.3.2 AVAILABILITY 
3.3.2.1 Objectives 
The availability assessment aims to estimate the availability of every device during the lifetime, which 
is defined as the uptime of the concerned device divided by the sum of downtime and uptime.   
3.3.2.2 Inputs, Models and Outputs 
Inputs 
The input data for assessing availability are listed in Section 2.1.2.3. 
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Table 3.4. See the description of the data structure of the downtime in Figure 2.1 in Section 2.1.2.3. 
TABLE 3.4 INPUTS FOR ASSESSING AVAILABILITY 
ID Brief Description of Input Quantity Origin of the Data 
Data Model in 
RAMS 
Unit 
t_down The downtime of devices in the array The LMO tool 
Multi-
dimensional 
array 
hour 
 
Theoretical basis 
The time-based availability is equal to the uptime divided by the sum of update and downtime, as 
expressed in Eq. (1) [4]. 
𝐀𝐯𝐚𝐢𝐥𝐚𝐛𝐢𝐥𝐢𝐭𝐲 =
𝒕𝐮𝐩𝐭𝐢𝐦𝐞
𝒕𝐮𝐩𝐭𝐢𝐦𝐞+𝒕𝐝𝐨𝐰𝐧𝐭𝐢𝐦𝐞
                                                             (1) 
Outputs 
The output comprises the following item(s):  
 the availability of each device during the lifetime 
 the approximate estimation of availability of the array/farm 
3.3.3 MAINTAINABILITY 
3.3.3.1 Objectives 
The maintainability assessment aims to: 
 estimate the probability that the damaged components can be successfully repaired within a 
stated time period (t_specific) [5], based upon the MTTR provided by LMO and the user-defined 
standard deviation (Std)/ coefficient of variance (CoV) of the repair time. 
 
It should be noted that LMO only estimates the time-to-repair (TTR) for the concerned basic 
components which need to be repaired or replaced according to the pre-defined decision rules in 
LMO. The decision rules define which actions should be taken when failures occur.  
3.3.3.2 Inputs, Models and Outputs 
Inputs 
The input data for assessing maintainability are listed in Table 3.5. See the description of the 
maintenance plan in Section 2.1.2.4. 
TABLE 3.5 INPUTS FOR ASSESSING MAINTAINABILITY 
ID Brief Description of Input Quantity Origin of the Data 
Data Model in 
RAMS 
Unit 
MTTR 
The mean time to repair of basic 
components 
The LMO tool Dictionary hour 
pd The probabilistic distribution of theTTR User-defined String - 
Std/CoV 
The standard deviation or the 
coefficient of variance of the TTR 
User-defined Float hour 
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ID Brief Description of Input Quantity Origin of the Data 
Data Model in 
RAMS 
Unit 
t_specific 
The stated time interval during which a 
repair is done 
User-defined Float hour 
 
Theoretical basis 
The TTR follows a probabilistic distribution, e.g. Gaussian distribution, LogNormal distribution, and 
Exponential distribution. As mentioned in Section 2.2, MTTR is only estimated for the components 
which need to be repaired. For one damaged component, MTTR is considered the mean value of the 
probabilistic distribution for the TTR. The user can choose one of these default probabilistic 
distributions, input a Std (or CoV) for the chosen probabilistic distribution and input a specific time (t). 
According the definition of Maintainability, it is the probability that a damaged component can be 
successfully repaired within a stated time interval by given procedures and resources. The specific 
time (t) is the upper limit of the stated time interval. 
RAMS should calculate these probabilities for all components in the output from the LMO module 
and give the minimal probability as the criterion of maintainability for the array/ farm.  
The probability density functions (PDFs) for these default probabilistic distributions are as follows:  
1. Gaussian distribution 
𝑓T(𝑡) =
1
√2𝜋𝜎T
𝑒
−
1
2𝜎𝑇
2(𝑡−𝜇T)
2
                                                              (2) 
where the capitalised T denotes the stochastic variable TTR, 𝜇T and 𝜎T denote the mean and 
the standard deviation of the TTR, respectively.  
2. LogNormal distribution 
𝑓T(𝑡) =
1
√2𝜋𝜎ln⁡(T)
𝑒
−
1
2𝜎ln⁡(𝑇)
2 (𝑡−𝜇ln⁡(T))
2
                                                     (3) 
 
where the capitalised T denotes the stochastic variable TTR, 𝜇ln⁡(T)  and 𝜎ln⁡(T)  denote the 
mean and the standard deviation of the logged TTR, respectively.  
3. Exponential distribution 
𝑓T(𝑡) = 𝜆𝑒
−𝜆𝑡                                                                                (4) 
where the capitalised T denotes the stochastic variable TTR, 𝜆 denotes the failure rate.  
Outputs 
The outputs comprise the following items:  
 MTTR of basic components included in the hierarchies. 
 The probabilities of the concerned basic components (included in the hierarchies) that can be 
successfully repaired within the stated time interval given procedures and resources. 
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3.3.4 SURVIVABILITY 
3.3.4.1 Objectives 
The survivability assessment aims to estimate the probability of critical components surviving the 
stresses/ loads during the design lifetime from the perspectives of the ultimate and the fatigue limit 
states. Unless otherwise specified, it only focuses on the structural/mechanical units in an array. For 
example, PTOs in the Energy transformation subsystem (ET), mooring lines in the Station keeping 
(SK) subsystem.  
3.3.4.2 Inputs, Models and Outputs 
Inputs 
The input data for assessing the survivability are listed in Table 3.6. 
TABLE 3.6 INPUTS FOR ASSESSING SURVIVABILITY 
ID Brief Description of Input Quantity 
Origin of the 
Data 
Data Model in 
RAMS 
Unit 
stress_et_uls 
The ultimate stresses exerted upon the 
components in the ET subsystem 
The ET tool 
Multi-dimensional 
array 
MPa 
stress_et_fls 
The fatigue stresses exerted upon the 
components in the ET subsystem 
The ET tool 
Multi-dimensional 
array 
MPa 
stress_sk_uls 
The ultimate stresses exerted upon the 
components in the SK subsystem 
The SK tool 
Multi-dimensional 
array 
MPa 
stress_sk_fls 
The fatigue stresses exerted upon the 
components in the SK subsystem 
The SK tool 
Multi-dimensional 
array 
MPa 
N The number of cycles of stress ranges 
The SK&ET 
tool 
One-dimensional 
array 
- 
a 
log(a) is the intercept of log(N)-axis by 
the linear S-N curve. 
The SK&ET 
tool 
One-dimensional 
array 
- 
m 
The negative inverse slope of the linear 
S-N curve. 
The SK&ET 
tool 
One-dimensional 
array 
- 
 
Theoretical basis 
See ANNEX 2 for more details of the theoretical basis. 
Outputs 
The outputs comprise the following items:  
 the probabilities of critical components in the ET subsystem surviving the ultimate/extreme 
stresses/ loads. 
 the probabilities of critical components in the ET subsystem surviving the fatigue stresses. 
 the probabilities of critical components in the SK subsystem surviving the ultimate/extreme 
stresses/ loads. 
 the probabilities of critical components in the SK subsystem surviving the fatigue stresses. 
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4. THE IMPLEMENTATION 
4.1 THE ARCHITECTURE OF THE TOOL 
Each module of the DTOceanPlus suite is organized in three layers: 
 the Business Logic, including a set of modules, classes, libraries implementing all the 
functionalities of the modules. 
 the Application Programming Interface (API) that describes the services requested and provided 
by RAMS in a human-like language. 
 the Graphic User Interface (GUI) which provides the means for interacting with the user, with 
respect to collecting inputs from the users and displaying results, besides exporting/importing data 
to/from files. 
Brainstorm meetings have been held to confirm the input data provided by ET, ED, SK and LMO 
modules to the RAMS module. All tool developers have reached an agreement on the data structures 
of the input and output data in order to make the smooth and automatic data flow. The following two 
terminologies are defined and used in this manual.  
 Provider – refers to the tools providing the input data to other tools. 
 Consumer – refers to the tools receiving the input data from other tools. 
 Shared – refers to the case where some functions/methods are shared. 
The roles of the tools as a provider or a consumer are summarized in  Table 4.1. ‘P’, ‘C’ and ‘S’ represent 
the provider, the consumer, and the shared function, respectively.  
TABLE 4.1 LIST OF DATA EXCHANGED BETWEEN RAMS AND OTHER TOOLS 
Logic Gate Provider/ Consumer/Shared Function 
 ED ET SK LMO RAMS SG/SI 
Hierarchy P P P C C - 
Failure modes P P P C C - 
Stresses/ Loads - P P - C - 
Repair time - - - P C - 
Downtime  - - - P C - 
Failure Events - - - S P - 
Reliability - - - - P C 
Availability - - - - P C 
Maintainability - - - - P C 
Survivability - - - - P C 
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4.1.1 BUSINESS LOGIC 
4.1.1.1 Overview 
Basically, the RAMS module defines five classes used to estimate the metrics, as summarized below: 
 ArrayRams – a class gets the complexity level and calls the corresponding RamsReliabilityCpx#, 
RamsAvailabilityCpx#, RamsMaintainabilityCpx# and RamsSurvivabilityCpx# to perform 
assessments. 
 RamsReliabilityCpx# – a class performs the component-level and the system-level reliability 
assessment. 
▪ The component-level reliability assessment simulates the time to failure (TTF) of basic 
components and estimates the mean time to failures (MTTFs) of basic components. 
▪ The system-level reliability assessment estimates the probabilities of failure (PoFs) of units at 
higher levels in the hierarchies as a function of time.  
 RamsAvailabilityCpx# – a class estimates the availability of devices. 
 RamsMaintainabilityCpx# – a class estimates the maintainability of devices. 
 RamsSurvivabilityCpx# – a class estimates the survivability of devices. 
A ‘Cpx#’ is added to the end of each class name to differentiate the three complexity levels (# is 
substituted by 1,2 or 3). 
4.1.1.2 Class - ArrayRams 
Schematic Illustration 
See Figure 4.1 for the methods in the class ArrayRams. 
 
  FIGURE 4.1 THE ARRAYRAMS CLASS AND THE METHODS 
 
4.1.1.3 Class - RamsReliabilityCpx# 
Schematic Illustration 
See Figure 4.2 for the methods in the class RamsReliabilityCpx#. 
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  FIGURE 4.2 THE RAMSRELIABILITYCPX# CLASS AND THE METHODS 
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Inputs 
See Table 3.3 for more details. 
Methods 
sim_failure_event  
This method simulates the TTF of basic components in parallel and calculates the MTTFs of the basic 
components. The outputs are dumped to a dictionary with four keys, namely “component_id”, 
“ts_failure_event”, “mttf1” and “mttf2”.  
The key, “component_id”, contains the ids of the basic components for which the component-level 
reliability is assessed. The values are stored in a one-dimensional list.  
The key, “ts_failure_event”, contains the simulated TTF of the basic components and the values are 
stored in a two-dimensional list. Each row contains the TTF of a specific basic component. There is an 
one-to-one mapping between “ts_failure_event” and “component_id”, as shown in Figure 4.3.   
The key, mttf1, contains the MTTF of the basic components in “component_id” based upon the 
theoretical estimation. It is assumed that the TTF follows the exponential distribution. There are two 
one-to-one mapping, namely between “mttf1” and “component_id’ and between “mttf1” and 
“ts_failure_event”, as shown in Figure 4.3.  
The key, mttf2, contains the MTTF of the basic components in “component_id” by taking the 
arithmetic mean of the TTF simulated for the corresponding component in “ts_failure_event”. There 
are two one-to-one mapping, namely between ‘mttf2’ and “component_id” and between “mttf2” and 
“ts_failure_event”, as shown in Figure 4.3. 
 
  FIGURE 4.3 SKETCH ILLUSTRATING THE ONE-TO-ONE MAPPING – THE OUTPUTS OF THE 
COMPONENT-LEVEL RELIABILITY ASSESSMENT 
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calc_pof_system 
This method calculates the PoFs of the units at higher levels in the hierarchies based upon the classic 
fault tree (FT) algorithm. The input of a hierarchical structure must strictly comply with the template, 
as shown in Table 2.2 in Section 3, agreed by all the module developers.  The outputs are dumped to 
a list of dictionaries. The list has a dynamic number of entries, because of different hierarchies 
representing different subsystems. The dictionary has three keys, namely “name”,“pof_accumulate” 
and  “pof_annual”.  
The key, “name”, refers to the name of the item in the corresponding hierarchy, which represents a 
unit. The value is a string.  
The key, “pof_accumulate”, contains the accumulate PoFs of the unit with its name defined in “name” 
as a function of time. These values are stored in a one-dimensional list.  
The key, “pof_annuak”, contains the annual PoFs of the unit with its name defined in “name” as a 
function of time. These values are stored in a one-dimensional list.  
unique 
This method finds the unique entries in a list or array.  
k_out_of_n 
This method calculates the PoFs for the units which are connected to their children through a ‘k-out-
of-N’ logic gate.  
combination 
This method finds out all the possible permutations of a list/ array. This method is called by 
k_out_of_n. 
pre_process 
This method decodes the raw hierarchies in the json format and identifies / dumps such fields as 
Design Id, System, Type, Category, Parent, Child, Gate Type, Failure_Rate_Minor and 
Failure_Rate_Replacement to a numpy array. 
4.1.1.4 Class – RamsAvailabilityCpx# 
Schematic Illustration 
See Figure 4.4 for the methods in the class RamsAvailabilityCpx#. 
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FIGURE 4.4 THE RAMSAVAILABILITYCPX# CLASS AND THE METHODS 
 
Inputs 
See Section 2.1.2.3. 
Table 3.4 for more details. 
Methods 
calc_availability  
This method estimates the availability on the basis of devices, based upon IEC 61400-25-1. The 
outputs are dumped to a dictionary, with two keys, namely “device_id” and “availability_tb”. 
The key, “device_id”, contains the ids of the devices for which the availability is assessed. The values 
are stored in a one-dimensional list.  
The key, “availability_tb”, contains the availability of these devices and the values are stored in a 
one-dimensional list. There is a one-to-one mapping between “availability_tb” and “device_id”, as 
shown in Figure 4.5. 
 
FIGURE 4.5 SKETCH ILLUSTRATING THE ONE-TO-ONE MAPPING– THE OUTPUTS OF THE 
AVAILABILITY ASSESSMENT 
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4.1.1.5 Class – RamsMaintainabilityCpx# 
Schematic Illustration 
See Figure 4.6 for the methods in the class RamsMaintainabilityCpx#. 
 
FIGURE 4.6 THE RAMSAVAILABILITYCPX# CLASS AND THE METHODS 
Inputs 
See Table 3.5 for more details. 
Methods 
calc_ maintainability  
This method estimates the maintainability of devices. There are three typical probabilistic 
distributions (Gaussian, LogNormal and Exponential) of repair time for the end user to choose from. 
The outputs are dumped to a dictionary, with two keys, namely “device_id” and 
“probability_maintenance”.  
The key, “device_id”, contains the ids of the devices for which the maintainability is assessed. The 
values are stored in a one-dimensional list. 
The key, “probability_maintenance”, is a 1D list including the probabilities of successfully repairing 
the damaged components in some devices.  
4.1.1.6 Class – RamsSurvivabilityCpx# 
Schematic Illustration 
See Figure 4.7 for the methods in the class RamsSurvivabilityCpx#.  
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FIGURE 4.7 THE RAMSSURVIVABILITYSTGX CLASS AND THE METHODS 
Inputs 
See Table 3.6 for more details. 
Methods 
calc_survivability_uls  
This method estimates the probabilities of critical components surviving the stresses/ loads during 
the design lifetime. The outputs are dumped to a dictionary, with two keys, namely “device_id”, and 
“survival_uls”. 
The key, “device_id”, contains the ids of the devices for which the availability is assessed. The values 
are stored in a one-dimensional list.  
The key, “survival_uls”, contains the survival probabilities of devices and the values are stored in a 
one-dimensional list. Each entry in “survival_uls” gives the survival probability of the device in the 
same position of the “device_id”. 
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calc_survivability_fls  
This method estimates the probabilities of critical components surviving the stresses/ loads during 
the design lifetime. The outputs are dumped to a dictionary, with two keys, namely “device_id”, and 
“survival_fls”. 
The key, “device_id”, contains the ids of the devices for which the availability is assessed. The values 
are stored in a one-dimensional list.  
The key, “survival_fls”, contains the survival probabilities of devices and the values are stored in a 
one-dimensional list. Each entry in “survival_fls” gives the survival probability of the device in the 
same position of the “device_id”. 
4.1.2 API 
4.1.2.1 Overview 
The API of the DTOceanPlus software follows a representational state transfer (REST) approach and 
it uses HTTP as the transport protocol. RAMS API describes the services requested and provided by 
the RAMS modules in a professional manner, based upon the design principles of the OpenAPI 
specification. The backend of the RAMS module serves to communicate with other modules. The 
‘GET’ requests are sent to other modules to obtain the inputs to execute the assessments.  
The framework of the RAMS API will be presented in the following sub-sections.  
4.1.2.2   Paths 
The main services provided by the RAMS module are accessed through the paths summarized in Table 
4.2. 
TABLE 4.2 METHODS AND DESCRIPTIONS OF PATHS 
Path Method Description 
/rams GET 
The user can get all the active RAMS applications 
(projects). 
/rams POST 
The user can create a new RAMS application 
(project). 
/rams/{ramsId}/inputs GET 
The user can get a specific RAMS application 
(project) with the specific ramsId. 
/rams/{ramsId}/inputs PUT 
The user can get a specific RAMS application 
(project) with the specific ramsId and update it. 
/rams/{ramsId}/ inputs DELETE 
The user can delete a specific RAMS application 
(project) with the specific ramsId and update it. 
/rams/{ramsId}/reliability_component GET 
The user can get the component-level reliability 
results for a RAMS application (project) with the 
specific ramsId. 
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Path Method Description 
/rams/{ramsId}/reliability_system GET 
The user can get the system-level reliability results 
for a RAMS application (project) with the specific 
ramsId. 
/rams/{ramsId}/availability GET 
The user can get the availability results for a RAMS 
application (project) with the specific ramsId. 
/rams/{ramsId}/maintainability GET 
The user can get the maintainability results for a 
RAMS application (project) with the specific 
ramsId. 
/rams/{ramsId}/survivability_uls GET 
The user can get the survivability results for the 
ultimate limit state for a RAMS application 
(project) with the specific ramsId. 
/rams/{ramsId}/survivability_fls GET 
The user can get the survivability results for the 
fatigue limit state for a RAMS application (project) 
with the specific ramsId. 
 
4.1.3 SCHEMAS 
JSON should be briefly reviewed, before schemas are interpreted. JSON stands for JavaScript Object 
Notation. People can convert any JavaScript object into JSON and send JSON to the server. JSON 
Schema is a powerful tool for validating the structure of JSON data. 
The input and output schemas in the RAMS module are given in Table 4.3. 
TABLE 4.3 SCHEMAS INCLUDED IN THE RAMS MODULE 
Name of Schema Description 
InputsGeneral.yaml 
It defines the data type for the general information of a RAMS application 
(project), including ‘id’, ‘title’, ‘desc’, ‘complexity’, ‘status’ and ‘tags’ 
InputsSpecific.yaml 
It defines the data type for the full information of a RAMS application 
(project), including ‘id’, ‘title’, ‘desc’, ‘complexity’, ‘status’, ‘tags’, 
‘hierarchy_ed’, ‘hierarchy_et’, ‘hierarchy_sk’, ‘downtime’, ‘repair-time’, 
‘stress_uls_et’, ‘stress_fls_et’ and ‘stress_sk’ 
Availability.yaml It defines the data type of the availability assessment results. 
ReliabilityCompoment.yaml 
It defines the data type of the component-level reliability assessment 
results. 
ReliabilitySystem.yaml It defines the data type of the system-level reliability assessment results. 
Maintainability.yaml It defines the data type of the maintainability assessment results. 
SurvivabiltyUls.yaml 
It defines the data type of the survivability assessment results for the 
ultimate limit state. 
SurvivabiltyFls.yaml 
It defines the data type of the survivability assessment results for the 
fatigue limit state. 
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4.1.4 GUI 
The GUI of all DTOceanPlus modules will be based on the same libraries to guarantee a consistent 
visual look. 
The GUI of the RAMS module will be included into the main module and, as it could be seen from the 
mock-up in Figure 4.8, will generally consist of two parts. 
 
FIGURE 4.8 GUI MOCK-UP OF THE RAMS MODULE 
4.1.5 THE TECHNOLOGIES 
The classes and functions in Business Logic and the API of RAMS have been developed in Python 
version 3.7. The installation of the module requires the following packages:  
 Numpy 
 Flask 
 Flask-SQLalchemy 
 Flask-Marshmallow 
 Flask-cors 
 Request 
 Pandas 
 Scipy 
 Math 
 Csv 
 
The API will rely on OpenAPI specification v3.0.2. The GUI of the module will be developed in Vue.js, 
using the library Element-UI. 
4.2 TESTING AND VERIFICATION 
4.2.1 OVERVIEW 
Independent tests of classes and functions in Business Logic, Back End and API should be performed 
in order to debug the code. For Business Logic and Back End, the Pytest package is used to test the 
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potential errors and quantify the coverage rates. For API, the Dredd package is used to test the logic 
of API. 
4.2.2 PYTEST 
Pytest is a testing framework which allows us to write test codes using python and can be used for 
software testing at all levels. Ideally, the acceptance criterion of coverage rate is 100%. For the code 
coverage rates are shown in Figure 4.9. 
 
FIGURE 4.9 CODE COVERAGE RATES 
 
4.2.3 DREDD TEST 
Dredd is a language-agnostic command-line tool for validating API description document against 
backend implementation of the API. Generally, the procedure for running Dredd tests is as follows:  
 take your API description document 
 create expectations based on requests and responses documented in the document 
 make requests to tested API 
 check whether API responses match the documented responses 
 report the results 
Dredd should be configured through a continuous integration (CI) file, which is named ‘dredd-
local.yml’ in the RAMS module. Besides it, hooks should be defined in a file which is called by Dredd. 
The file is name ‘hooks.py’ in the RAMS module. The hooks are summarized in Table 4.4.  
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TABLE 4.4 SET-UP OF HOOKS 
Name of Schema Description 
Hooks for /rams 
@hooks.before("/rams > Returns all the active RAMS 
projects > 200 > application/json") 
To test if the registered function under the blueprint 
@bp.route('/rams', methods='GET') can return all the 
RAMS projects, as required in the OpenAPI. 
@hooks.before("/rams > Returns all the active RAMS 
projects > 404") 
To test if the registered function under the blueprint 
@bp.route('/rams', methods='GET') can return an error 
message due to no created project, as required in the 
OpenAPI. 
@hooks.before("/rams > Creates a new rams project > 201") 
To test if the registered function under the blueprint 
@bp.route('/rams', methods='POST') can create a 
RAMS project, as required in the OpenAPI. 
@hooks.before("/rams > Creates a new rams project > 400") 
To test if the registered function under the blueprint 
@bp.route('/rams', methods='POST') can return an error 
message due to the wrong required information (e.g. a 
wrong ramsID) as required in the OpenAPI. 
Hooks for /rams/{ramsId}/inputs 
@hooks.before("/rams/{ramsId}/inputs > Returns the 
specific RAMS project > 200 > application/json") 
To test if the registered function under the blueprint 
@bp.route('/rams/<ramsId>', methods='GET') can 
return the RAMS project with the specific ramsId as 
required in the OpenAPI. 
@hooks.before("/rams/{ramsId}/inputs > Returns the 
specific RAMS project > 404") 
To test if the registered function under the blueprint 
@bp.route('/rams/<ramsId>', methods='GET') can 
return an error message due to a wrong ramsId, as 
required in the OpenAPI. 
@hooks.before("/rams/{ramsId}/inputs > Modifies a specific 
rams project > 201 > application/json") 
To test if the registered function under the blueprint 
@bp.route('/rams/<ramsId>', methods='PUT') can 
modify the information in an existing project as required 
in the OpenAPI. 
@hooks.before("/rams/{ramsId}/inputs > Modifies a specific 
rams project > 400") 
To test if the registered function under the blueprint 
@bp.route('/rams/<ramsId>', methods='PUT') can 
return an error message due to a wrong ramsId, as 
required in the OpenAPI. 
@hooks.before("/rams/{ramsId}/inputs > Delete a specific 
RAMS project > 200") 
To test if the registered function under the blueprint 
@bp.route('/rams/<ramsId>', methods='DELETE') can 
delete the RAMS project with the specific ramsId as 
required in the OpenAPI. 
@hooks.before("/rams/{ramsId}/inputs > Delete a specific 
RAMS project > 404") 
To test if the registered function under the blueprint 
@bp.route('/rams/<ramsId>', methods=' DELETE ') can 
return an error message due to a wrong ramsId as 
required in the OpenAPI. 
Hooks for /rams/{ramsId}/reliability_component 
@hooks.before("/rams/{ramsId}/reliability_component > 
Returns the reliability assessment results > 200 #> 
application/json") 
To test if the registered function under the blueprint 
@bp.route('/rams/<ramsId>}/reliability_component ', 
methods='GET') can return the component-level 
reliability assessment results for the RAMS project with 
the specific ramsId, as required in the OpenAPI. 
@hooks.before("/rams/{ramsId}/reliability_component > 
Returns the reliability assessment results > 404") 
To test if the registered function under the blueprint 
@bp.route('/rams/<ramsId>}/reliability_component ', 
methods='GET') can return an error message due to a 
wrong ramsId, as required in the OpenAPI. 
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Name of Schema Description 
Hooks for /rams/{ramsId}/reliability_system 
@hooks.before("/rams/{ramsId}/reliability_system > 
Returns the system-level reliability assessment #results > 
200 > application/json") 
To test if the registered function under the blueprint 
@bp.route('/rams/<ramsId>}/reliability_system ', 
methods='GET') can return the system-level reliability 
assessment results for the RAMS project with the 
specific ramsId, as required in the OpenAPI. 
@hooks.before("/rams/{ramsId}/reliability_system > 
Returns the system-level reliability assessment #results > 
404") 
To test if the registered function under the blueprint 
@bp.route('/rams/<ramsId>}/reliability_system ', 
methods='GET') can return an error message due to a 
wrong ramsId, as required in the OpenAPI. 
Hooks for /rams/{ramsId}/availability 
@hooks.before("/rams/{ramsId}/availability > Returns the 
availability of devices > 200 > application/#json") 
To test if the registered function under the blueprint 
@bp.route('/rams/<ramsId>}/ availability , 
methods='GET') can return the availability of devices for 
the RAMS project with the specific ramsId, as required in 
the OpenAPI. 
@hooks.before("/rams/{ramsId}/availability > Returns the 
availability of devices > 404") 
To test if the registered function under the blueprint 
@bp.route('/rams/<ramsId>}/ availability , 
methods='GET') can return an error message due to a 
wrong ramsId, as required in the OpenAPI. 
Hooks for /rams/{ramsId}/maintainability 
@hooks.before("/rams/{ramsId}/maintainability > Returns 
the maintainability assessment results > 200 > 
#pplication/json") 
To test if the registered function under the blueprint 
@bp.route('/rams/<ramsId>}/ maintainability , 
methods='GET') can return the maintainability of 
devices for the RAMS project with the specific ramsId as 
required in the OpenAPI. 
@hooks.before("/rams/{ramsId}/maintainability > Returns 
the maintainability assessment results > 404") 
To test if the registered function under the blueprint 
@bp.route('/rams/<ramsId>}/ maintainability , 
methods='GET') can return an error message due to a 
wrong ramsId, as required in the OpenAPI. 
Hooks for /rams/{ramsId}/survivability_uls 
@hooks.before("/rams/{ramsId}/survivability_uls > Returns 
the probability of surviving the ultimate #loads > 200 > 
application/json") 
To test if the registered function under the blueprint 
@bp.route('/rams/<ramsId>}/ survivability_uls , 
methods='GET') can return the survival probabilities of 
devices for the RAMS project with the specific ramsId, 
as required in the OpenAPI. 
@hooks.before("/rams/{ramsId}/survivability_uls > Returns 
the probability of surviving the ultimate #loads > 404") 
To test if the registered function under the blueprint 
@bp.route('/rams/<ramsId>}/ survivability_uls , 
methods='GET') can return an error message due to a 
wrong ramsId, as required in the OpenAPI. 
Hooks for /rams/{ramsId}/survivability_fls 
@hooks.before("/rams/{ramsId}/survivability_fls > Returns 
the probability of surviving the fatigue loads > 200 > 
application/json") 
To test if the registered function under the blueprint 
@bp.route('/rams/<ramsId>}/ survivability_Fls , 
methods='GET') can return the survival probabilities of 
devices for the RAMS project with the specific ramsId, 
as required in the OpenAPI. 
@hooks.before("/rams/{ramsId}/survivability_fls > Returns 
the probability of surviving the fatigue #loads > 404") 
To test if the registered function under the blueprint 
@bp.route('/rams/<ramsId>}/ survivability_fls , 
methods='GET') can return an error message due to a 
wrong ramsId, as required in the OpenAPI. 
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5. EXAMPLES 
In this section, an example for each functionality implemented in RAMS has been performed and the 
outputs are presented. It is important to stress that specified inputs were generated for illustration 
purposes only and do not correspond to any specific project or technology. Consequently, the 
obtained outputs do not hold any meaning and are not necessarily realistic. These were chosen as 
merely representative values to be used as a demonstration of the computational capabilities of the 
RAMS module. 
5.1 RELIABILITY 
A virtual marine energy farm will be used to demonstrate how reliability is assessed will be presented 
in the following subsections.  
Basically, a marine energy conversion system is composed of three major sub-systems, namely  
 the energy transformation (ET) subsystem 
 the energy delivery (ED) subsystem 
 the station keeping (SK) subsystem 
It should be noted that the deployment design modules are all at the stage of concept design, and 
there are no concrete sketches showing the general layout of the corresponding subsystems. 
Therefore, there are only tables defining the hierarchies of these subsystems in this subsection. The 
design lifetime is assumed to be 20 years in this subsection. 
The target annual probability of failure (PoF) is 10-3 recommended in IEC  TS 62600-2 (Table 5-2) [12], 
which is the primary design standard for marine energy conversion systems. The objective of 
reliability assessment is to: 
 check whether or not the estimated annual PoFs of all the subsystems are less than this target 
during the design lifetime. The maximum annual PoF will be given.  
5.1.1 ED SUBSYSTEM 
5.1.1.1 Inputs 
In this example, the ED subsystem is composed of three independent energy transfer routes, i.e. 
ED_OEC# (#=1, 2, 3). The ED subsystem fails, if all the energy transfer routes fail. According to the 
rule defined in Table 2.1, an ‘OR’ is inserted (an ‘AND’ gate should be inserted in the fault tree).  
ED_OEC# contains only one Route#. The symbol # represents _1_1, _2_1 or _3_1. Each Route# 
contains two basic components, EC# (#=1 ,2, 3) and CON# ((#=1 ,2, 3). Each Route# fails if either EC# 
or CON# fails. According to the rule defined in Table 2.1, an ‘AND’ is inserted (actually, an ‘OR’ gate 
should be inserted in the fault tree). See the hierarchy defined in  
Table 5.1. It should be noted that: the failure rates are only estimated based upon the assumption that 
the TTF of basic components follows the exponential distribution in this example. 
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TABLE 5.1 THE HIERARCHY OF THE ED SUBSYSTEM 
System 
Name of 
Node 
Design Id 
Node 
Type 
Node 
Subtype 
Category Parent Child 
Gate 
Type 
Failure Rate 
Repair(1) 
[1/hour] 
Failure Rate 
Replacement(2) 
[1/hour] 
ED ED Subsystem "NA" System System Level 3 "NA" 
[ED_OEC1, 
ED_OEC2, 
ED_OEC3] 
OR "NA" "NA" 
ED ED_OEC1 "NA" Subsystem Subsystem Level 2 "NA" [Route1_1] OR "NA" "NA" 
ED ED_OEC2 "NA" Subsystem Subsystem Level 2 "NA" [Route2_1] OR "NA" "NA" 
ED ED_OEC3 "NA" Subsystem Subsystem Level 2 "NA" [Route3_1] OR "NA" "NA" 
ED Route1_1 Route1_1 Energy route Energy route Level 1 ED_OEC1 [EC1, CON1] AND "NA" "NA" 
ED Route2_1 Route2_1 Energy route Energy route Level 1 ED_OEC2 [EC2, CON2] AND "NA" "NA" 
ED Route3_1 Route3_1 Energy route Energy route Level 1 ED_OEC3 [EC3, CON3] AND "NA" "NA" 
ED CON1 CON1 Component Component Level 0 Route1_1 "NA" "NA" 5.71E-07(3) "NA" 
ED CON2 CON2 Component Component Level 0 Route2_1 "NA" "NA" 5.71E-07(3) "NA" 
ED CON3 CON3 Component Component Level 0 Route3_1 "NA" "NA" 5.71E-07(3) "NA" 
ED EC1 EC1 Component Component Level 0 Route1_1 "NA" "NA" 5.71E-07(3) "NA" 
ED EC2 EC2 Component Component Level 0 Route2_1 "NA" "NA" 5.71E-07(3) "NA" 
ED EC3 EC3 Component Component Level 0 Route3_1 "NA" "NA" 5.71E-07(3) "NA" 
Note:  
1) These failure rates refer to failure mode 1 mentioned in Section 2.1.2.1. Failure mode 1 refers to the failures which can be restored through repair. 
2) These failure rates refer to failure mode 2 mentioned in Section 2.1.2.1. Failure mode 2 refers to the cases in which the severely failed components can only be replaced. 
3) These failure rates correspond to the mean time to failure (MTTF) of 200 years.  
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5.1.1.2 Results 
Component-level 
The core algorithm is based on the stochastic sampling, which has uncertainty. Because of uncertainty 
of the sampling algorithm, TTFs should be different between various realizations. For each basic 
component, the estimated time to failure (TTF) is dumped to a list. It is possible to obtain an empty 
list, i.e. ‘[]’, which indicates that no failure occurs during the design lifetime. If failures are estimated, 
the TTFs are ordered in a list. See one realization for each basic component in Table 5.2. It should be 
noted that the TTF for each basic component only represent one realization. As mentioned in Section 
2.2, TTF is assumed to follow the exponential distribution. So, the theoretical MTTF is just the 
reciprocal of the failure rate.  
TABLE 5.2 RESULTS OF TTF OF BASIC COMPONENTS IN THE ED SUBSYSTEM 
Component 
ID 
TTF 
[hour] 
CON1 
[145,738] 
(about 16.6 years) 
CON2 
[44,748] 
(about 5.1 years) 
CON3 
[168,414] 
(about 19.2 years ) 
EC1 
[33,242] 
(about years 3.8) 
EC2 
[24,687] 
(about 2.8 years) 
EC3 
[146,814] 
(about 16.8 years) 
 
System-level 
In the code for assessing the system-level reliability, the accumulated PoFs of the units at higher levels 
in the hierarchy are first calculated, and then the accumulated PoFs are differentiated to obtain the 
annual PoFs which are compared with the target PoF. The annual PoF as a function of time for the ED 
subsystem is shown in Figure 5.1. The maximum annual PoF is 7.75×10-4. The annual PoFs indicate 
that the ED subsystem satisfies the design requirement on the safety, i.e. any PoF is lower than the 
target PoF recommended in [12].  
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FIGURE 5.1 THE POF OF THE ED SUBSYSTEM AS A FUNCTION OF TIME 
5.1.2 ET SUBSYSTEM 
5.1.2.1 Inputs 
In this example, there is only one device considered in the array. So, the ET subsystem of the array 
only contains the two PTOs attached to this device. The ET subsystem fails if both of PTOs fail. 
According to the rule defined in Table 2.1, an ‘OR’ is inserted (an ‘AND’ gate should be inserted in the 
fault tree).  Each PTO is composed of three basic components, namely H2M#, M2E# and E2G#. The 
symbol # represents _1_1 or _1_2. The PTO fails, if either of H2M#, M2E# and E2G# fails. According 
to the rule defined in Table 2.1, an ‘AND’ is inserted (an ‘OR’ gate should be inserted in the fault tree).  
See the hierarchy in Table 5.3.  
5.1.2.2 Results 
Component-level 
The core algorithm is based on the stochastic sampling, which has uncertainty. Because of uncertainty 
of the sampling algorithm, TTFs should be different between various realizations. For each basic 
component, the estimated time to failure (TTF) is dumped to a list. It is possible to obtain an empty 
list, i.e. ‘[]’, which indicates that no failure occurs during the design lifetime. If failures are estimated, 
the TTFs are ordered in a list. See one realization for each basic component in Table 5.4. It should be 
noted that the TTF for each basic component only represent one realization. As mentioned in Section 
2.2, TTF is assumed to follow the exponential distribution. So, the theoretical MTTF is just the 
reciprocal of the failure rate. 
 
 
D6.3  
Reliability, Availability, Maintainability and Survivability Assessment Tool – 
Alpha version 
 
 
 DTOceanPlus Deliverable, Grant Agreement No 785921 Page 44 | 66   
TABLE 5.3 THE HIERARCHY OF THE ET SUBSYSTEM 
System 
Name of 
Node 
Design Id 
Node 
Type 
Node 
Subtype 
Category Parent Child 
Gate 
Type 
Failure Rate 
Repair(1) 
[1/hour] 
Failure Rate 
Replacement(2) 
[1/hour] 
ET Device_01 "NA" System System Level 2 "NA" 
[PTO_1_1, 
PTO_1_2] OR 
"NA" "NA" 
ET PTO_1_1 "NA" PTO PTO Level 1 Device_1 
[H2M_1_1, 
M2E_1_1, 
E2G_1_1] AND 
"NA" "NA" 
ET PTO_1_2 "NA" PTO PTO Level 1 Device_1 
[H2M_1_2, 
M2E_1_2, 
E2G_1_2] AND 
"NA" "NA" 
ET H2M_1_1 H2M_1_1 Component Component Level 0 PTO_1_1 "NA" "NA" 1.92E-07(3) "NA" 
ET H2M_1_2 H2M_1_2 Component Component Level 0 PTO_1_2 "NA" "NA" 1.92E-07(3) "NA" 
ET M2E_1_1 M2E_1_1 Component Component Level 0 PTO_1_1 "NA" "NA" 1.92E-07(3) "NA" 
ET M2E_1_2 M2E_1_2 Component Component Level 0 PTO_1_2 "NA" "NA" 1.92E-07(3) "NA" 
ET E2G_1_1 E2G_1_1 Component Component Level 0 PTO_1_1 "NA" "NA" 1.92E-07(3) "NA" 
ET E2G_1_2 E2G_1_2 Component Component Level 0 PTO_1_2 "NA" "NA" 1.92E-07(3) "NA" 
Note:  
1) These failure rates refer to failure mode 1 mentioned in Section 2.1.2.1. Failure mode 1 refers to the failures which can be restored through repair. 
2) These failure rates refer to failure mode 2 mentioned in Section 2.1.2.1. Failure mode 2 refers to the cases in which the severely failed components can only be 
replaced. 
3)   These failure rates correspond to the mean time to failure (MTTF) of 595 years.
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TABLE 5.4 RESULTS OF TTF OF BASIC COMPONENTS IN THE ET SUBSYSTEM 
Component 
ID 
TTF 
[hour] 
H2M_1_1 
[108,199] 
(about 12.4 years) 
H2M_1_2 
[79,658] 
(about 9.1 years) 
M2E_1_1 
[163,592] 
(about 18.7 years) 
M2E_1_2 
[98,181] 
(about 11.2 years) 
E2G_1_1 
[157,463] 
(about 18.0 years) 
E2G_1_2 
[95,996] 
(about 11.0 years) 
 
System-level 
In the code for assessing the system-level reliability, the accumulated PoFs of the units at higher levels 
in the hierarchy are first calculated, and then the accumulated PoFs are differentiated to obtain the 
annual PoFs which are compared with the target PoF. The annual PoF as a function of time for the ET 
subsystem is shown in Figure 5.2. The maximum annual PoF is 8.57×10-4. The annual PoFs indicate 
that the ED subsystem satisfies the design requirement on the safety, i.e. any PoF is lower than the 
target PoF recommended in [12]. 
 
FIGURE 5.2 THE POF OF THE ET SUBSYSTEM AS A FUNCTION OF TIME 
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5.1.3 SK SUBSYSTEM 
5.1.3.1 Inputs 
In this example, there is only one device considered in the array. So, the SK subsystem of the array 
only contains the four mooring lines attached to this device. The SK subsystem fails, if all mooring 
lines fail. According to the rule defined in Table 2.1, an ‘OR’ is inserted (an ‘AND’ gate should be 
inserted in the fault tree).   See the hierarchy in Table 5.5.  
5.1.3.2 Results 
Component-level 
The core algorithm is based on the stochastic sampling, which has uncertainty. Because of uncertainty 
of the sampling algorithm, TTFs should be different between various realizations. For each basic 
component, the estimated time to failure (TTF) is dumped to a list. It is possible to obtain an empty 
list, i.e. ‘[]’, which indicates that no failure occurs during the design lifetime. If failures are estimated, 
the TTFs are ordered in a list. See one realization for each basic component in Table 5.6. It should be 
noted that the TTF for each basic component only represent one realization. As mentioned in Section 
2.2, TTF is assumed to follow the exponential distribution. So, the theoretical MTTF is just the 
reciprocal of the failure rate. 
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TABLE 5.5 THE HIERARCHY OF THE SK SUBSYSTEM 
System 
Name of 
Node 
Design Id 
Node 
Type 
Node 
Subtype 
Category Parent Child 
Gate 
Type 
Failure Rate 
Repair(1) 
[1/hour] 
Failure Rate 
Replacement(2) 
[1/hour] 
SK SK Subsystem "NA" System System Level 1 "NA" 
[ML1, ML2, 
ML3, ML4 ] 
OR "NA" "NA" 
SK ML1 ML1 Component Component Level 0 SK Subsystem "NA" "NA" 1.95E-06(3) "NA" 
SK ML2 ML2 Component Component Level 0 SK Subsystem "NA" "NA" 1.95E-06(3) "NA" 
SK ML3 ML3 Component Component Level 0 SK Subsystem "NA" "NA" 1.95E-06(3) "NA" 
SK ML4 ML4 Component Component Level 0 SK Subsystem "NA" "NA" 1.95E-06(3) "NA" 
Note:  
1) These failure rates refer to failure mode 1 mentioned in Section 2.1.2.1. Failure mode 1 refers to the failures which can be restored through repair. 
2) These failure rates refer to failure mode 2 mentioned in Section 2.1.2.1. Failure mode 2 refers to the cases in which the severely failed components can only be replaced. 
3)  These failure rates correspond to the mean time to failure (MTTF) of 58 years.
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TABLE 5.6 RESULTS OF TTF OF BASIC COMPONENTS IN THE SK SUBSYSTEM 
Component 
ID 
TTF 
[hour] 
ML1 
[16,085, 67,532, 166,067] 
(about 1.84, 7.7, 19.0 years) 
ML2 
[30,297, 111,301] 
(about 3.5, 12.7 years) 
ML3 
[24,193, 148,908] 
(about 2.8, 17.0 years) 
ML4 
[101,507, 149,302] 
(about 11.6, 17.0 years) 
 
System-level 
In the code for assessing the system-level reliability, the accumulated PoFs of the units at higher levels 
in the hierarchy are first calculated, and then the accumulated PoFs are differentiated to obtain the 
annual PoFs which are compared with the target PoF. The annual PoF as a function of time for the SK 
subsystem is shown in ¡Error! No se encuentra el origen de la referencia.. The maximum annual PoF 
is 1.11×10-3. The annual PoFs indicate that the ED subsystem does satisfy the design requirement on 
the safety after Year 19. The suggestion can be to choose more reliable basic components with lower 
failure rates than those used in this example. 
 
FIGURE 5.3 THE POF OF THE SK SUBSYSTEM AS A FUNCTION OF TIME 
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5.2 AVAILABILITY 
5.2.1 INPUTS 
The business logic is the same for three complexity levels. The generic inputs are given in Table 5.7. 
The number in each entry is the downtime in the corresponding month of the year.  It is assumed that 
the design lifetime is 10 years, because the input of downtime only represents 10 years.  
TABLE 5.7 AN EXAMPLE OF DOWNTIME FOR TWO DEVICES 
Month 
Downtime 
[hour] 
Year 
1 
Year 
2 
Year 
3 
Year 
4 
Year 
5 
Year 
6 
Year 
7 
Year 
8 
Year 
9 
Year 
10 
Device 11 
Jan. 744 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Feb. 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Mar. 0 43 0 0 0 0 432 15 0 15 
April 0 0 0 0 0 564 0 0 0 0 
May 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Jun. 0 0 196 0 124 0 532 0 0 0 
Jul. 0 0 0 643 0 324 0 0 0 0 
Aug. 56 0 0 0 56 0 56 0 0 0 
Sep. 0 145 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Oct. 0 0 0 88 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Nov. 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Dec. 0 0 0 0 0 0 159 0 0 0 
Device 12 
Jan. 744 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Feb. 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Mar. 0 43 0 0 0 0 0 15 0 0 
April 0 0 0 0 0 532 0 0 0 180 
May 0 0 0 0 0 42 0 0 0 0 
Jun. 0 0 0 0 124 0 0 0 0 0 
Jul. 0 140 0 643 0 324 0 0 0 0 
Aug. 56 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 720 
Sep. 0 0 543 0 0 0 0 0 0 720 
Oct. 0 0 0 643 0 0 120 453 0 744 
Nov. 0 0 0 0 47 0 0 0 0 720 
Dec. 0 0 0 0 96 0 0 0 0 744 
 
5.2.2 RESULTS 
All the downtime should be summed for each device and the availability of each device is the ratio of 
the uptime (design lifetime - downtime) to the design lifetime. The results of availability are given in 
Table 5.8. The array availability can be approximately taken as the arithmetic average of the device 
availability.  
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TABLE 5.8 RESULTS OF AVAILABILITY ASSESSMENT 
Unit 
Availability 
[%] 
Device11 95.21 
Device12 90.42 
Array 92.82 
 
5.3 MAINTAINABILITY 
5.3.1 INPUTS 
The business logic is the same for three complexity levels. The generic inputs extracted from the data 
set exported by the LMO module are given in Table 5.9. According to the coding rule in the LMO 
module, the repair time is only estimated for the components which fail during the design lifetime. 
The TTF is predicted by using the function in the shared library. If a component will not be subject to 
any failure, the corresponding element in the column MTTR will be ‘NA’.  
The probabilistic distribution of repair time is assumed to follow the Gaussian distribution. The user 
may want to know the probability that the damage component can be successfully repaired in t=24 
hours. In light of the high uncertainty in offshore on-site repair, a high standard deviation of 18 hours 
is assumed (in reality, this should be input by the user).  
TABLE 5.9 A SAMPLE OF MTTR 
Operational Id Component Id  
MTTR 
[hour] 
op13_1 ml11 NA 
op12_1 ml12 NA 
op13_2 ml13 43 
op12_2 ml14 NA 
 
5.3.2 RESULTS 
The probability that the component ‘mul13’ can be successfully repaired within t=24 hours is 14.6%. 
Since there is only one component, the maintainability of the whole array is 14.6%. 
5.4 SURVIVABILITY 
Basically, the classic structural reliability analysis methods, e.g. Monte Carlo and First Order Reliability 
Method (FORM), are used in the code. The critical structural components in the SK module will be 
used as an example in this subsection.  
It is assumed that there is a sample array containing four devices. Each device is kept in place through 
four mooring lines. Tension is assumed to be the dominating load for both ultimate and fatigue limit 
states. Unless otherwise specified, the load refers to tension and the stress ranges refer to those  
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caused by the alternating tensions. Monte Carlo Method is used. The design lifetime is assumed to be 
20 years in this subsection. 
5.4.1  INPUTS 
5.4.1.1 Ultimate Limit State 
According to the extreme strength analysis performed in the SK module, the four devices are subject 
to the identical ultimate loads. The ultimate loads exerted on the four mooring lines of one device are 
used to estimate the mean load. The standard deviation or coefficient of variance (CoV) is estimated 
based upon the engineering experience. The maximum breaking load (MBL) is the material resistance 
of the mooring lines, provided by the SK module. In nature, both load and MBL are stochastic 
variables. So, two uncertainty factors, which are also stochastic variables, are applied to load and 
MBL, respectively. See Table 5.10 for these inputs.  
Note: Since these variables are assumed to follow the LogNormal distribution, the mean values and 
standard deviations of the logged variables are given as follows:  
𝜇ln⁡(𝑆) = 11.2873 𝜎ln⁡(𝑆) = 0.2936  
𝜇ln⁡(𝑅) = 12.4866 𝜎ln⁡(𝑅) = 0.1980  
𝜇ln⁡(𝑋𝑆) = −0.004975 𝜎ln⁡(𝑋𝑆) = 0.09975 
𝜇ln⁡(𝑋𝑆) = −0.004975 𝜎ln⁡(𝑋𝑆) = 0.09975 
TABLE 5.10 INPUTS FOR THE ULTIMATE SURVIVABILITY ASSESSMENT 
Variable Description 
Probabilistic 
Distribution 
Mean 
𝝁 
CoV 
S The load exerted upon the mooring lines LogNormal 83,313 N 0.3 
R The material resistance of mooring lines LogNormal 270,000 N 0.2 
XS The uncertainty factor for the load LogNormal 1.0 0.1 
XR The uncertainty factor for the MBL LogNormal 1.0 0.1 
 
5.4.1.2 Fatigue Limit State 
According to the fatigue analysis performed in the SK module, the four devices are subject to the 
identical fatigue loads. The fatigue stresses for one device are used in this subsection.  
The stress ranges and the corresponding cumulative distribution functions, both of which are 
discretized to 10 bins, will be used to fit the shape and scale parameters of  the 2-parameter Weibull 
distribution of the long-term stress ranges. The procedure for fitting the parameters is as follows:  
The cumulative 2-parameter Weibull distribution function is defined in Eq. (5). 
𝐹(∆𝑠) = 1 − 𝑒−(∆𝑠 𝐵⁄ )
𝐴
                                                                        (5) 
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Take logarithm of both sides in Eq. (5) twice to obtain Eq. (6) 
ln{−l n[1 − 𝐹(∆𝑠)]} = 𝐴[ln(∆𝑠) − l n( 𝐵)]                                                   (6) 
Let 
Y = ln{−ln⁡[1 − 𝐹(∆𝑠)]}                                                                     (7) 
X = ln(∆𝑠)                                                                                  (8) 
where ∆𝑠 denotes the stress range. 𝐹(∆𝑠) denotes the cumulative distribution function of the stress 
range. A and B are the shape and scale parameters of the 2-parameter Weibull distribution. A linear 
regression can be performed through the transformations in Eqs.(7)-(8). The coefficient of 
determination (R2) is calculated to evaluate the goodness of fit. The better a linear regression fits the 
data, the closer the value of R2 is to 1. The equations for calculating R2 are as follows:  
𝑅2 = 1 −
∑ (𝑌𝑖−?̅?)
2
𝑖
∑ (𝐴[𝑋𝑖−ln(𝐵)]−?̅?)
2
𝑖
                                                                  (9) 
where 𝑌𝑖  is the i-th observation. ?̅?  is the mean of all the observations. The term 𝐴[𝑋𝑖 − l n( 𝐵)] 
denotes the fitted Y at each 𝑋𝑖.   
As mentioned in Section 2.1.2.2, the S-N curve-based approach is used to assess the survivability from 
the perspective of fatigue limit state. The variables include the number of cycles of stress ranges, the 
S-N curve parameters a and m, and the Weibull distribution parameters A and B. See Table 5.11 for 
these inputs.  
TABLE 5.11 INPUTS FOR THE FATIGUE SURVIVABILITY ASSESSMENT 
Variable Description 
Probabilistic 
Distribution 
Mean 
𝝁 
CoV 
a 
log(a) is the intercept of log(N)-axis by the 
linear S-N curve.  
LogNormal 27.09(1) 0.251) 
m 
the negative inverse slope of the linear S-N 
curve. 
Constant 3.0 - 
A 
The shape parameter of the 2-parameter 
Weibull distribution of the long-term stress 
ranges Constant 
See ¡Error! 
No se 
encuentra el 
origen de la 
referencia. 
- 
B 
The scale parameter of the 2-parameter 
Weibull distribution of the long-term stress 
ranges 
LogNormal 
See Table 
5.13 
0.5 
N The number of cycles of stress ranges Constant 1e8 - 
Note:  1) 𝜇𝑙𝑛(𝑎) = 27.09  𝜎𝑙𝑛(𝑎) = 0.25𝜇𝑙𝑛(𝑎) 
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5.4.2 RESULTS 
5.4.2.1 Ultimate Limit State 
The probability that the most critical mooring line can survive the ultimate/ extreme load during the 
design lifetime, and the corresponding reliability index are given in Table 5.12. 
TABLE 5.12 SUMMARY OF SURVIVABILITY ASSESSMENT - ULTIMATE LIMIT STATE 
Survival Probability 
1-PoF 
PoF Reliability Index 
99.92% 7.89×10-4 3.16 
 
5.4.2.2 Fatigue Limit State 
Based upon the procedure, the fitted shape and scale parameters, as well as R2, are given in Table 
5.13. The fitted Weibull distribution is shown for four mooring lines in Figure 5.4~Figure 5.7¡Error! No 
se encuentra el origen de la referencia.. Since there are only 10 points used to fit the distribution 
parameters, all the values of R2 are quite low, especially for mooring line 2.  The goodness of fit can 
be improved by increasing the number of bins.  
TABLE 5.13 SUMMARY OF FITTED SHAPE AND SCALE PARAMETERS 
Mooring Line 
Shape Parameter 
A 
[-] 
Scale Parameter 
B 
[MPa] 
R2 
ML1 1.845 0.0917 0.219 
ML2 1.499 0.0473 0.077 
ML3 1.777 0.0867 0.296 
ML4 1.786 0.115 0.284 
 
 
FIGURE 5.4 THE FITTED WEIBULL DISTRIBUTION FOR MOORING LINE 1 
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FIGURE 5.5 THE FITTED WEIBULL DISTRIBUTION FOR MOORING LINE 2 
 
 
FIGURE 5.6 THE FITTED WEIBULL DISTRIBUTION FOR MOORING LINE 3 
 
 
FIGURE 5.7 THE FITTED WEIBULL DISTRIBUTION FOR MOORING LINE 4 
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The structural reliability analyses have been performed for the four mooring lines, considering the 
four different cases of the shape and scale parameters. The most critical mooring line is ML4. The 
survival probability for ML4, and the corresponding reliability index are given in Table 5.14. 
TABLE 5.14 SUMMARY OF SURVIVABILITY ASSESSMENT - FATIGUE LIMIT STATE 
Survival Probability 
1-PoF 
PoF Reliability Index 
99.93% 7.44×10-4 3.178 
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6. FUTURE WORK 
The deliverable presents the framework and functionalities of the Reliability, Availability, 
Maintainability and Survivability (RAMS) module, implemented in T6.4 of the DTOceanPlus project. 
For the time being, the RAMS module can be run in a standalone mode. However, the additional 
works summarized as follows should be done in order to integrate it to the DTOceanPlus software 
platform:  
 The OpenAPI file should be “linked” to the other module’s equivalent files, in order to guarantee a 
smooth, robust and consistent data flow among the different pieces of the tool.  
 The GUI will be developed to be consistent with the other tools and to provide the user with an 
easy access to the tool and its functionalities.  
 The unit tests, including Pytest, Dredd and PACT, will be improved to fix any potential bugs.  
 The verification in T6.7 will be started, when all the modules are fully developed. 
 
The remaining work is part of the continuous development/integration methodology described in 
Deliverable D7.4 “Handbook of software implementation” [13]. These activities will be developed 
within T6.7 Verification of the code – beta version in order to extend the functionality of the RAMS 
module from standalone to fully integrated in the DTOceanPlus toolset. 
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ANNEX 1: BRIEF INTRODUCTION ON THE THEORETICAL 
METHODS FOR RELIABILITY ASSESSMENT 
A1.1 COMPONENT-LEVEL RELIABILITY  
The objective of component-level reliability assessment is to: 
 simulate the time series of failure events of basic components under the fundamental assumption 
that the failures of these basic components are statistically independent. 
 estimate the mean time to failure (MTTF) of these basic components. 
The procedure for simulating failure events is summarized as follows: 
 obtain the input data, e.g. the design life, the time unit of design life, failure rates of the basic 
components to be analysed, the probabilistic distribution of time-to-failure (TTF) (by default, it is 
assumed to follow exponential distribution). 
 simulate failure events based upon the algorithm described below. 
The Monte Carlo simulation is the basic methodology used to randomly generate discrete failure 
events. The probabilistic lifetime distribution of all basic components or subassemblies is assumed to 
follow the exponential distribution. The time to failure has the following probability distribution 
function. 
𝑭(𝒕) = 𝑷(𝑻 ≤ 𝒕) = 𝟏 − 𝒆−𝝀𝒕                                              (A1-1) 
The time to failure corresponding to a probability ?̂? is re-expressed by Eq. (A1-2).  
                                                                               𝒕 = −
𝟏
𝝀
𝒍𝒏[𝟏 − ?̂?(𝒕)]                                                            (A1-2) 
where, 𝜆 is the failure rate of a basic component. The capitalised T denotes the stochastic variable of 
the time to failure. The variable t represents the stated time.  
The lifetime simulation of failure events for any component can be presented as follows.  
 Step 1: to initiate the input parameters, e.g. the start-up time (t0), the lifetime (tL) and the failure 
rate 
 Step 2: to uniformly sample a number from [0, 1] based upon Eq. (A1-1) 
 Step 3: to obtain the i-th (i=1,2,3…) failure time tfi based upon Eq. (A1-2)  
 Step 4: to check whether or not the termination criterion is satisfied (tfi is greater than tL); if yes, 
terminate this lifetime simulation; otherwise, shift t0 to tfi and go to step 2 to continue sampling. 
Based upon the fundamental assumptions in Section 2.2, the TTF follows the exponential distribution. 
So, the theoretical MTTF of each basic component is just equal to the inverse of its failure rate, as 
expressed in Eq. (A1-3). 
𝑀𝑇𝑇𝐹𝑘 =
1
𝜆𝑘
                                                                       (A1-3) 
where 𝜆𝑘denotes the failure rate of the k-th basic component in 1/hour.  
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Based upon the simulated TTF for each basic component, MTTF can be taken as the average of the 
TTFs, as expressed in Eq. (A1-4). 
𝑀𝑇𝑇𝐹 =
1
𝑛
∑ 𝑇𝑇𝐹𝑖
𝑛
𝑖=1                                                                    (A1-4) 
A1.2 SYSTEM-LEVEL RELIABILITY  
Basically, the classic fault tree (FT) is used to calculate the probability of failure (PoF) of the units at 
higher level in the hierarchy. The detailed review of FT theory is out of the scope of this user manual. 
Therefore, the application of FT will be elaborated on a case study for the ED subsystem in a marine 
energy conversion system (array). It should be noted that this case study may be not exactly the same 
as the examples presented in Section Example, however, the purpose is to demonstrate the 
procedure to help the readers understand the system-level reliability.  
A1.2.1 BACKGROUND INFORMATION OF ENERGY TRANSFER NETWORKS   
An energy transfer network, a subsystem in marine energy converter farm, serves to transport the 
generated power to the onshore terminal. Typical topologies of such an energy transfer network are 
shown in Figure A1.1. The hierarchy of the system will be detailed in Section 4.2. The white bubbles 
with dashed boundary lines represent the marine energy converters (MECs) connected to the main 
cables represented by black bold lines, through the orange circles marked with numbers from 1 to 9 
represent the connectors. Due to no tailor-made reliability database for marine energy converters, 
the failure rates of the basic components can be referred to some generic database for electrical 
components in other industrial applications [14] and also should be subject to engineering judgement. 
The failure rates to be used are given in Table A1.1.  
TABLE A1.1 INTERPRETATIONS OF NODES IN FT AND BN  
Item Labels in FT 
Value 
[1/hour] 
AC1 X1 2.54×10-6 
AC2 X2 2.54×10-6 
AC3 X3 2.54×10-6 
AC4 X4 2.54×10-6 
AC5 X5 2.54×10-6 
AC6 X6 2.54×10-6 
Connector 1 X11 6.24×10-7 
Connector 2 X12 6.24×10-7 
Connector 3 X13 6.24×10-7 
Connector 4 X14 6.24×10-7 
Connector 5 X15 6.24×10-7 
Connector 6 X16 6.24×10-7 
Connector 7 X17 6.24×10-7 
Connector 8 X18 6.24×10-7 
Connector 9 X19 6.24×10-7 
CP1 X20 9.83×10-7 
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FIGURE A1.1 SKETCH OF ENERGY TRANSFER NETWORK TOPOLOGY  
 
A1.2.2 QUALITATIVE SYSTEM ANALYSIS  
The working philosophy of each subsystem and the way these subsystems are aggregated to form 
the marine energy conversion system can be investigated through qualitative system analysis. The 
aim of a qualitative system analysis is to obtain the hierarchy of a unit, which could refer to either of 
system, subsystem, sub-assembly, and to understanding the logic interrelationship between these 
units. With the knowledge of the hierarchical structures, the traditional FT method will be used to 
assess the PoFs or reliability of the units at different levels. 
Several rounds of brain-storm workshops have been held to understand the working philosophy of 
the energy transfer system. Based upon the expert’s review comments, the hierarchy of the energy 
transfer system has been clearly defined.  
There are two independent energy transfer routes respectively connected to CP1 through the 
connectors 7 & 8 and two cables AC3 & AC6. The electricity is finally transmitted to the onshore 
terminal through the connector 9. Suppose that the two energy transfer routes are considered as a 
virtual unit denoted by T1. T1 is considered as a 1st-level sub-assembly. If either of CP1, X19 and T1 
fails, the energy transfer system (T0) will be shut down (no electricity generated). 
T1 is composed of two identical energy transfer routes respectively denoted by T2 and T3, which are 
the 2nd-level sub-assemblies. T1 fails, if both T2 and T3 fail.  
T2 comprises X17, X3, a virtual unit T4, which comprises the other connectors directly connected to 
MECs and the other cables connecting these connectors. If either X17, X3 or T4 fails, this energy 
transfer route will be shut down. T2 can be considered a series system. T3 comprises X18, X6, a virtual 
unit T5, which comprises the other connectors directly connected to MECs and the other cables 
connecting these connectors. If either X18, X6 or T5 fails, this energy transfer route will be shut down. 
T3 can be considered a series system. Both T4 and T5 constitutes the 3rd-level sub-assembly. 
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T4 comprises X2, X13 and another virtual unit T6. If either two of X2, X13 and T6 fail, T4 fails. In a 
similar way, T5 comprises X6, X16 and another virtual unit T7. If either two of X6, X16 and T7 fail, T5 
fails. Both T6 and T7 constitutes the 4th-level sub-assembly. 
T6 comprises X12 and another virtual unit T8. If either X12 or T8 fails, T6 fails. T7 comprises X15 and 
another virtual unit T9. If either X15 or T9 fails, T7 fails. Both T8 and T9 constitutes the 5th-level sub-
assembly.  
T8 comprises X11 and X1. If either X11 or X1 fails, T8 fails. T9 comprises X14 and X4. If either X14 or X4 
fails, T9 fails. 
Based upon the qualitative system analysis, the hierarchy of the ET subsystem has been clearly 
defined, with its compact format given in Table A1.2. The data in Table A1.2 are all drawn from the 
hierarchy presented in Table A1-2, however, are renamed (some fields in Table A1.2 are changed to 
the technical terminologies in FT) and re-structured.  
The first column gives the subsystem to be analysed. All failure events are considered nodes in the 
hierarchy. The second column, ‘Name of Node’, gives the names of these failure events. The third 
column, ‘Design Id’, gives the identification labels of the basic components and other units. Design Ids 
are named according to the rules/ conventions of the ED module. The column, ‘Type’, defines the 
levels of a fault tree. The column, ‘Category’, defines which levels the nodes in the ‘Name of Node’ 
column belong to in the fault tree. The columns ‘Affiliated to’ and ‘Affiliated by’ define the 
dependencies of units at various levels. Each entry in ‘Affiliated to’ defines the label of the higher-level 
unit which the current unit in the column ‘Name of Node’ belongs to. Each entry in ‘Affiliated by’ 
defines the labels of lower-level units which belong to the current unit. Based upon the 
aforementioned descriptions, the units in the column ‘Affiliated by’ are connected through a specific 
logic gate to the higher-level unit. The logic gates are given in the column ‘Gate Type’. The logic gate 
in each entry of this column is used to connect the unit in the column ‘Name of Node’ and the units in 
the column ‘Affiliated by’. The last two columns give the failure rates of basic components for both 
Type 1& 2 failure modes. For now, these failure rates are dummy data, which do not influence the 
demonstration of the system reliability assessment methodology. 
Based upon the qualitative system analysis, the fault tree can be constructed accordingly. The top 
event is denoted ‘Failure of ET system (T0)’. The intermediate failure events underneath the top event 
refer to ‘Failure of X19 (denoted X19 in the fault tree)’, ‘Failure of X20 (denoted X20 in the fault tree)’ 
and ‘Failure of T1’. An 'OR' gate is inserted according to the working philosophy. For simplicity, the 
label name is hereafter used to represent the failure event of this unit in the fault tree.  
If ‘Failure of T1’ is considered the top failure event, the intermediate failure events refer to the two 
‘Failure of T2’ or ‘Failure of T3’ events. An 'AND' gate is inserted according to the working philosophy. 
If ‘Failure of T2’ is considered the top failure event, the intermediate failure events refer to ‘Failure of 
X17 (denoted X17 in the fault tree)’, ‘Failure of X3 (denoted X3 in the fault tree)’ and ‘Failure of T4’. An 
'OR' gate is inserted according to the working philosophy. If ‘Failure of T3’ is considered the top failure 
event, the intermediate failure events refer to ‘Failure of X18 (denoted X18 in the fault tree)’, ‘Failure 
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of X6 (denoted X6 in the fault tree)’ and ‘Failure of T5’. An 'OR' gate is inserted according to the 
working philosophy. 
If ‘Failure of T4’ is considered the top failure event, the intermediate failure events refer to ‘Failure of 
X13 (denoted X13 in the fault tree)’, ‘Failure of X2 (denoted X2 in the fault tree)’ and ‘Failure of T6)’ A 
'2/3' gate is inserted according to the working philosophy. If ‘Failure of T5’ is considered the top failure 
event, the intermediate failure events refer to ‘Failure of X16 (denoted X16 in the fault tree)’, ‘Failure 
of X5 (denoted X5 in the fault tree)’ and ‘Failure of T7’. A '2/3' gate is inserted according to the working 
philosophy. 
If ‘Failure of T6’ is considered the top failure event, the intermediate failure events refer to ‘Failure of 
X12 (denoted X12 in the fault tree)’ and ‘Failure of T8’. An 'OR' gate is inserted according to the 
working philosophy. If ‘Failure of T7’ is considered the top failure event, the intermediate failure 
events refer to ‘Failure of X15 (denoted X15 in the fault tree)’ and ‘Failure of T9’. An 'OR' gate is 
inserted according to the working philosophy. 
If ‘Failure of T8’ is considered the top failure event, the bottom failure events refer to ‘Failure of X11 
(denoted X11 in the fault tree)’ and ‘Failure of X1 (denoted X1 in the fault tree)’. An 'OR' gate is inserted 
according to the working philosophy. If ‘Failure of T9’ is considered the top failure event, the bottom 
failure events refer to ‘Failure of X14 (denoted X14 in the fault tree)’ and ‘Failure of X4 (denoted X4 in 
the fault tree)’. An 'OR' gate is inserted according to the working philosophy. The fault tree of the ET 
subsystem is shown in Figure A1.2. 
TABLE A1.2 HIERARCHY OF ENERGY TRANSFER SYSTEM 
Unit Type Category 
Affiliated to 
(parent) 
Affiliated by 
(child) 
Gate Type 
T0 System Level 6 N.A. [X19, X20, T1] OR 
T1 1st-level sub-assembly Level 5 T0 [T2, T3] AND 
T2 2nd-level sub-assembly Level 4 T1 [X17, X3, T4] OR 
T3 2nd -level sub-assembly Level 4 T1 [X18, X6, T5] OR 
T4 3rd-level sub-assembly Level 3 T2 [X13, X2, T6] 2/3 
T5 3rd -level sub-assembly Level 3 T3 [X16, X5, T7] 2/3 
T6 4th -level sub-assembly Level 2 T4 [X12, T8] OR 
T7 4th -level sub-assembly Level 2 T5 [X15, T9] OR 
T8 5th -level sub-assembly Level 1 T6 [X11, X1] OR 
T9 5th -level sub-assembly Level 1 T6 [X14, X4] OR 
X11 Basic Component Level 0 T8 N.A. N.A. 
X12 Basic Component Level 0 T6 N.A. N.A. 
X13 Basic Component Level 0 T4 N.A. N.A. 
X14 Basic Component Level 0 T9 N.A. N.A. 
X15 Basic Component Level 0 T7 N.A. N.A. 
X16 Basic Component Level 0 T5 N.A. N.A. 
X17 Basic Component Level 0 T2 N.A. N.A. 
X18 Basic Component Level 0 T3 N.A. N.A. 
X19 Basic Component Level 0 T0 N.A. N.A. 
X1 Basic Component Level 0 T8 N.A. N.A. 
X2 Basic Component Level 0 T4 N.A. N.A. 
X3 Basic Component Level 0 T2 N.A. N.A. 
X4 Basic Component Level 0 T9 N.A. N.A. 
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Unit Type Category 
Affiliated to 
(parent) 
Affiliated by 
(child) 
Gate Type 
X5 Basic Component Level 0 T5 N.A. N.A. 
X6 Basic Component Level 0 T2 N.A. N.A. 
X20 Basic Component Level 0 T0 N.A. N.A. 
 
 
(a) Main Fault Tree 
   
(b) Detailed Branches underneath T4                  (c) Detailed Branches underneath T5 
FIGURE A1.2 FAULT TREE OF ENERGY TRANSFER SYSTEM 
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ANNEX 2: BRIEF INTRODUCTION ON THE THEORETICAL 
METHODS FOR SURVIVABILITY ASSESSMENT 
A2.1 OVERVIEW 
This annex briefly presents the methodology of the structural reliability analysis, which serves the 
theoretical basis for the survivability assessment. The structural reliability analysis will be performed 
from the perspectives of both ultimate and fatigue limits states.  
A2.2 LIMIT STATE FUNCTIONS 
A2.2.1 ULTIMATE LIMIT STATE 
The ultimate failure modes can be further divided into two categories. Category 1 is the strength 
failure. Category 2 is the buckling failure (stability). Compared with the progressive failure mode (e.g. 
fatigue failure), the limit state function for the ultimate limit state is easier formulated. This limit state 
function is given by Eq. (A2-1).  
𝑔(𝑋1, 𝑋2, … , 𝑋𝑛) = 𝑋𝑅𝑅(𝑋1, 𝑋2, … ) − 𝑋𝑆𝑆(… , 𝑋𝑛)                                        (A2-1) 
where R is a stochastic variable and represents the resistance of the material of a component. S is a 
stochastic variable and represents the stress/ load exerted upon the component. 𝑋𝑅  and 𝑋𝑆  model 
uncertainty related to resistance and load models, respectively. 𝑋1, 𝑋2, … , 𝑋𝑛  refer to the other 
parameters related to the resistance and stress/load models. The probability P(𝑔(𝑋1, 𝑋2, … , 𝑋𝑛) > 0) 
is the probability of a component surviving the stresses/ loads during the design lifetime. See [8], [10], 
[11] for the details regarding how to calculate the probability.  
A2.2.2 FATIGUE LIMIT STATE 
There are a few ways to define the fatigue limit state functions. In this annex, the S-N-curve-based 
limit state function will be presented. Unless otherwise specified, the S-N curves for welded steel 
structures or non-welded structures are only considered.  
Linear S-N curve 
The limit state function is given by Eq. (A2-2).  
𝑔(𝐴, 𝐵, 𝑁, 𝑎,𝑚) = − ln(𝑁) + ln(𝑎) − 𝑚 ln(𝐵) − ln⁡ (𝛤 (1 +
𝑚
𝐴
))                   (A2-2) 
where A and B are the shape and scale parameters of the 2-parameter Weibull distribution of the long-
term stress ranges. log⁡(𝑎) denotes the intercept of log(N)-axis by the linear S-N curve. 𝑚 denotes 
the negative inverse slope of the linear S-N curve. N denotes the total number of stress range cycles 
during the design lifetime. See [8], [10], [11] for the details regarding how to calculate the probability. 
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Bi-linear S-N curve 
The limit state function is given by Eq. (A2-3). 
𝑔(?̅?) = ∆ −
𝑇𝜐0
𝑎1
{𝐴
𝑚1𝐺1 [1 +
𝑚1
𝐵
, (
𝑆𝑠𝑤
𝐴
)
𝐵
] +
𝑎1
𝑎2
𝐴
𝑚2𝐺2 [1 +
𝑚2
𝐵
, (
𝑆𝑠𝑤
𝐴
)
𝐵
]}               (A2-3) 
where 𝐺1[∙,∙]  denotes the complementary incomplete Gamma function, and 𝐺2[∙,∙]  denotes the 
incomplete Gamma function. ?̅? = (𝐴, 𝐵, 𝑆𝑠𝑤 , 𝑇, 𝑎1, 𝑎2, 𝑚1,𝑚2, ∆, 𝜐0) . The stochastic variable, ∆ , 
denotes the fatigue capacity and reflects the resistance of weld material. 𝜐0  is the mean zero up-
crossing frequency. T is the design lifetime (the unit should be compatible with 𝜐0). 𝜐0𝑇 represents 
the total number of stress range cycles during the design lifetime. log⁡(𝑎1) and log⁡(𝑎2) denote the 
intercepts of log(N)-axis by the bilinear S-N curve, respectively. 𝑚1  and 𝑚2  denote the negative 
inverse slopes of the bilinear S-N curve, respectively. A and B are the shape and scale parameters of 
the 2-parameter Weibull distribution of the long-term stress ranges. 𝑆𝑠𝑤 denotes the stress range at 
the intersection of the bi-linear S-N curve. See [8], [10], [11] for the details regarding how to calculate 
the probability. 
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